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When Structural Principles Hold
Merely Locally
ULF HLOBIL1
Abstract: In substructural logics, structural principles may hold in some
fragments of a consequence relation without holding globally. I look at this
phenomenon in my preferred substructural logic, in which Weakening and
Cut fail but which is supra-intuitionistic. I introduce object language oper-
ators that keep track of the admissibility of Weakening and of intuitionistic
implications. I end with some ideas about local transitivity.
Keywords: Structural Principles, Nonmonotonic Logic, Nontransitive
Logic, Logical Expressivism, Inferentialism, Atomic Systems
1 Introduction
Consequence relations are traditionally thought to obey the following—so-
called structural—principles:2
WEAKENING If Γ ` A and ∆ ⊇ Γ, then ∆ ` A.
CUT If Γ ` A and Γ, A ` B, then Γ ` B.
CONTRACTION If Γ, A,A ` B, then Γ, A ` B.
PERMUTATION If Γ, A,B,∆ ` C, then Γ, B,A,∆ ` C.
REFLEXIVITY If A ∈ Γ, then Γ ` A.
1Thanks goes to Robert Brandom, Daniel Kaplan, Shuhei Shimamura, Rea Golan and the
audience at the Logica 2016 conference for invaluable comments, criticism and feedback. The
work I am presenting here is part of my contribution to a joint project of Robert Brandom’s
research group. I also thank Graham Priest, who got me started on this (sub)project by asking
me whether I had anything like Girard’s shriek for my preferred logic.
2The first two are also known as (i) “monotonicity” or “monotony” or “MO,” and (ii) “cu-
mulative transitivity” or “CT.” Reflexivity is also known as “identity” or “containment” or
“CO.”
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Substructural logics are logics in which at least one of these five conditions
fails. A nonmonotonic logic (denoted by “ |∼”) is one in which Weakening
fails. Even in a nonmonotonic logic, however, there can be a set Θ such that
for all ∆ ⊇ Θ we have ∆ |∼ A. In such a case, we may say that Θ implies
A “monotonically” or “persistently.” We can think of this as monotonicity
holding locally at the sequent Θ |∼ A.
Suppose we could say in the object language that A is a monotonic con-
sequence of Θ, e.g., by having an operator M such that Θ implies MA iff
Θ persistently implies A. We could then view monotonic logic as merely a
restricted perspective on a shared topic: Monotonic logic looks at the turn-
stile as if it were always followed by a silent M. Such an operator lets us
say what the monotonic logician is getting right and which consequences
she simply ignores. Analogous ideas apply to the other structural rules.
When we look at the matter in this way, a new task for logicians becomes
visible, namely the task of investigating and developing the expressive re-
sources that are needed to think about local structural features. If logicians
study and develop such expressive resources, they give us the expressive
tools to be explicit about the structural features that we think our inferences
obey and to disagree about whether we are right about this in a particular
case. Acquiring these expressive resources will allow us to see structural
logics as being blind to everything but a very special class of consequences
and lacking the expressive power to see how special these consequences
really are.
These ideas bear some resemblance, e.g., to Girard’s (1987) recovery
of intuitionistic logic within linear logic. In linear logic Weakening and
Contraction fail. Girard introduces an operator “!” (shriek) that, in ef-
fect, allows applications of Weakening and Contraction. You can weaken
any sequent with !A on the left, and you can contract !A !A to !A on the
left. With this operator in hand, Girard can define a translation function,
θ, such that A1, ..., An `int B holds in intuitionistic logic just in case
!θ(A1), ..., !θ(An) `linear θ(B) holds in linear logic. Thus, we have an op-
erator that allows us to use the structural rules that distinguish linear logic
from intuitionistic logic in a controlled fashion, and we can thus use the
operator to recover intuitionistic logic.
There are three main differences between Girard’s recovery of intuition-
istic logic and my aims in the remainder of this paper. First and most im-
portantly, I am looking for ways of making something explicit that is there
anyway. I start with a material consequence relation over atomic sentences,
and I want to keep track of the structural principles that hold locally in this
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material consequence relation and its logical extension. I don’t want to sim-
ply create a new part of the language in which certain structural principles
hold by introducing a new operator. That is what Girard does by allowing
us to weaken any sequent with !A irrespective of the weakening behavior of
the sequent before the introduction of shriek. In contrast to this, I want to
find ways to express facts about where structural principles hold locally even
before we introduce any new expressions. Second, the structural principles
with which I will be concerned are Weakening and Cut, rather than Weak-
ening and Contraction. Third, the substructural logic I shall work with is
supra-intuitionistic. Hence, the problem of “recovering” intuitionistic logic
is really just the problem of singling out all and only the implications that
this logic shares with intuitionistic logic.
The paper is structured as follows: In Section 2, I introduce the substruc-
tural logic with which I will be working. I then show how to introduce an
operator that says, in the object language, that Weakening holds at a sequent
(Section 3). In Section 4, I introduce an object language expression that al-
lows us to keep track of intuitionistic implications. I end, in Section 5, with
some ideas about the local admissibility of Cut.
2 A Nonmonotonic and Nontransitive Logic
In this section, I introduce the reader to the substructural logic within which
I want to keep track of the admissibility of some structural principles and of
intuitionistic logic. I will do so very briefly, as I have laid out a very similar
logic in more detail elsewhere (Hlobil, 2016).
2.1 Philosophical Background
The logic that I will be concerned with is motivated by semantic inferen-
tialism, i.e. the view (very roughly) that the meaning of a sentence is settled
once it is settled what follows from it, what it follows from, and what is
incompatible with it.3 For our current purposes, we can think of inferen-
tialism as the view that the meaning of a sentence is given by its place in a
consequence relation and incoherence property defined over the language to
which it belongs.
3I am ignoring here how causal relations—especially perception and action—play a role in
the fixation of meaning. Of course, a plausible semantic inferentialism must ultimately include
what Sellars (1954) calls “language-entry transitions” and “language-exit transitions.”
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Inferentialism is a general claim about content, not just a claim about the
meaning of logical vocabulary (Brandom, 1994; Peregrin, 2014). The claim
applies to atomic sentences just as much as it applies to logically complex
sentences. Now, formal consequence relations are closed under uniform
substitutions of atomic sentences. In other words, formal consequence re-
lations assign to all atomic sentences symmetrical inferential roles. Any
set of atoms implies all its members and no other atoms. These only min-
imally different inferential roles can hardly suffice to confer genuinely dis-
tinct meanings onto the different atomic sentences. So if we want to capture
the inferential roles of atomic sentences, we must reject the idea that all con-
sequence relations are formal. Rather, we must allow that a set of atomic
sentences implies another atomic sentence that is not in the set.
Once we accept such material implications, it becomes natural to think
of logic as extending a given material consequence relation (and incoher-
ence property) to logically complex sentences.4 Logic introduces logical
vocabulary into an atomic language whose sentences already stand in rich
inferential relations.
Now, it seems that the inferential and incompatibility relations between
atomic sentences are virtually always defeasible. After all, we can normally
infer that the streets are wet from the fact that it is raining, but it can happen
that the authorities have covered up the streets to protect it from the rain,
etc. Hence, the consequence relation over the atomic language with which
we begin must be nonmonotonic. Given that a logic should extend this
relation in a conservative fashion, the consequence relation that results from
introducing logical vocabulary must also be nonmonotonic.
At this point a second motivating idea behind this logic becomes rele-
vant: logical expressivism (Brandom, 2008). According to logical expres-
sivism, it is the expressive job of logical vocabulary to allow us to express
claims about the inferential and incoherence roles of non-logical expressions
(where the “about” must not be understood in a representationalist fashion).
The paradigm case is the conditional. According to logical expressivism,
the conditional lets us claim that the antecedent implies the consequent (in
a given context). If we spell this out in a non-representationalist way, we
should say something like this: You have reasons to assert a conditional just
in case these reasons together with the antecedent are reasons to assert the
4Similar ideas have recently been discussed under the heading of “atomic systems” or
“atomic bases” and extensions thereof (Sandqvist, 2015). The present approach differs from
familiar approaches in that it doesn’t enforce transitivity in the atomic base. Thus, we reject
what is sometimes called “definitional reflection.”
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consequent. In other words, a deduction-detachment theorem (DDT) holds:
DDT Γ |∼ A→ B iff Γ, A |∼ B.
This is a substantive constraint on the inferential behavior of the conditional.
It is justified by the claim that it is the job of the conditional to let us express
what follows from what. The conditional makes explicit the consequence
relation. Together with Reflexivity, DDT implies that our logic must be
nontransitive. For a reflexive consequence relation in which DDT holds and
that obeys Cut must be monotonic.5
The upshot of all this is that if you accept the inferentialism and ex-
pressivism I am endorsing, then you need rules for introducing logical con-
nectives that extend a nonmonotonic, material consequence relation in such
a way that the resulting consequence relation is not only nonmonotonic but
also nontransitive and obeys DDT. Furthermore, the rules governing the log-
ical connectives should be plausible, in the sense that they can naturally be
thought to capture the meanings of the logical connectives.
2.2 A Sequent Calculus
In order to construct a system that has the properties just mentioned, we start
with a consequence relation and incoherence property over a finite atomic
language, L0−. In order to represent the consequence relation and the in-
coherence property in a unified fashion, we first introduce the symbol “⊥,”
which functions like an empty right side in Gentzen’s sequent calculus for
intuitionistic logic in that it cannot be embedded and can only occur on the
right. Let L0 = L0− ∪ {⊥}. We define the relation |∼0⊆ P(L0−)× L0 by
saying that Γ |∼0 p holds just in case either (i) p =⊥ and Γ is materially
incoherent or (ii) Γ materially implies p. We require that |∼0 obeys Reflex-
ivity and that if ∀∆ ⊆ L0− (Γ,∆ |∼0⊥), then Γ |∼ p for all atoms, p, in
L0−. The second requirement, which I call ex falso fixo quodlibet (ExFF),
is a restricted version of explosion, which applies only if a set is not only in-
coherent but is, as I shall say, persistently incoherent, i.e., all of its supersets
are incoherent.
We now give a sequent calculus formulation of the extended conse-
quence relation. I call the resulting system NM (for Non-Monotonic). Our
5A mixed-context version of Cut together with Reflexivity implies Weakening even without
DDT. After all, suppose that Γ |∼ A. By Reflexivity, Γ,∆, A |∼ A. By mixed-context Cut,
Γ,∆ |∼ A. The deduction-detachment theorem is just needed to show that the same holds for
shared-context versions of Cut.
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axioms are all the sequents in the underlying material consequence rela-
tion, |∼0. Moreover, we define not only a single snake-turnstile but one
for every X ⊆ P(L0−). The idea is that Γ |∼↑X p holds just in case
∀∆ ∈ X (∆,Γ |∼ p). By convention we can write Γ |∼↑P(L0−) p as
Γ |∼↑ p. Our axioms are:
Axioms of NM:
Ax1: If Γ|∼0 p, then Γ|∼ p is an axiom.
Ax2: If X ⊆ P(L0−) and ∀∆ ∈ X (∆,Γ|∼0 p), then Γ|∼↑X p
is an axiom.
We define the extended consequence relation, |∼, as the smallest relation
that closes these axioms under the following rules.
Rules of NM:
Notation: The square brackets mean that what is inside the
brackets is optional or, if preceded by a “/ ”, that it is an alter-
native. The rules are systematically ambiguous: unless a rule
explicitly contains a sequent with an upward arrow, the rule
applies if we uniformly replace the plain snake-turnstile by a
snake-turnstile with an upward arrow with a particular set of
atomic sets throughout the rule. In LC, we can uniformly sub-
stitute the right top-sequent and the root-sequent for ones with
the same upward arrow. In PushUp, the top sequent cannot have
an upward arrow.
Γ, A |∼ B
RC
Γ |∼ A→ B
Γ |∼ ↑A Γ, B |∼ C
LC
Γ, A→ B |∼ C
Γ, A |∼ ⊥
RN
Γ |∼ ¬A
Γ |∼ A
LN
Γ,¬A |∼ ⊥
Γ |∼ A Γ |∼ B
R&
Γ |∼ A&B
Γ, A,B |∼ C
L&
Γ, A&B |∼ C
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Γ |∼ A [/B]
Rv
Γ |∼ A ∨B
Γ, A |∼ C Γ, B |∼ C
Lv
Γ, A ∨B, [A], [B] |∼ C
Γ |∼ ↑A
pCW
Γ, B → C |∼ [↑]A
Γ |∼ ↑A
pNW
Γ,¬B |∼ [↑]A
Γ |∼ ↑XA Γ |∼ ↑YA
UN
Γ |∼ ↑X∪YA
p1...pn,Γ |∼ A
PushUp
Γ |∼↑{{p1...pn}} A
Γ |∼ ↑ ⊥
ExFF
Γ |∼ [↑]A
This gives us a nonmonotonic consequence relation over a language, L−,
that contains conditionals, negations, conjunctions, and disjunctions. All
but the last five rules should look more or less familiar from standard se-
quent calculi. The differences to familiar versions of the connective rules—
e.g. that LC requires a persistent sequent as the left premise-sequent—are
all such that they cannot even be formulated in a monotonic setting. Note
that we are building in permutation and contraction by working with sets on
the left.
Among the unfamiliar rules, pCW and pNW allow us to weaken with
conditionals and negations respectively if we can weaken with arbitrary sets
of atoms. And UN and PushUp allow us to form new upward arrows. ExFF
can be viewed as a restricted version of Gentzen’s right weakening rule.
Since our axioms contain no logically complex sentences, Reflexivity
isn’t true by stipulation in NM. It can be shown, however, that the rules
preserve Reflexivity. Moreover, it can be shown that the extension is con-
servative, i.e., if Γ ⊆ L0− and p ∈ L0, then Γ |∼ p iff Γ |∼0 p. This
ensures not only that our connectives don’t trivialize the consequence rela-
tion in a “tonk-like” fashion; it also shows that they don’t change the facts
that they are meant to make explicit and that they don’t force monotonic-
ity. Furthermore, the connectives are well-behaved. The conditional obeys
the deduction-detachment theorem. A negation is implied just in case the
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premises together with the negated sentences are incoherent. A conjunction
is implied just in case both conjunctions are implied. And a disjunction is
implied just in case at least one of the disjuncts is implied.
In sum, the NM system gives us a surprisingly well-behaved nonmono-
tonic logic that conservatively extends a nonmonotonic material consequence
relation. Moreover, NM is supra-intuitionistic.
Theorem 1 NM is supra-intuitionistic, i.e., if Γ ` A holds in intuitionistic
logic, then Γ |∼ A holds in NM.
Proof. Due to limitations of space, I just give a sketch of the proof. First, we
notice that Cut and Weakening can both be eliminated in Gentzen’s sequent
calculus formulation of intuitionistic logic, LJ, if we are allowed to use as
our axioms atomic instances of Reflexivity, i.e., if the leaves of the proof-
trees can be of the form p0, ..., pn ` pn.6 Next, we notice that Weakening
is admissible in NM proof-trees all of whose leaves are instances of Re-
flexivity. This is because we can weaken such leaves with arbitrary atoms.
Given these facts, we can show that every proof-tree that uses the rules of
LJ but not Cut or Weakening and whose leaves are instances of Reflexivity
(with context) can be translated into NM because we can translate all the
remaining rules of LJ into NM.
The translation from LJ works as follows: KA and Cut are eliminated.
KS translates into ExFF after making the premise-sequent persistent via
PushUp and UN. W and C are given by working with sets. FES translates
into RC. FEA can be derived from LC after making the left premise-sequent
persistent. The translations of the rules for conjunction, disjunction and
negation are similarly straightforward. 
Although NM is supra-intuitionistic, Weakening and Cut are not globally
admissible in NM. Outside of the intuitionistic fragment of the consequence
relation they may fail. Can we introduce operators that allow us to keep
track—in the object language—of the admissibility of Weakening and Cut?
And can we introduce an operator that allows us to make explicit, in the
object language, that an implication of NM also holds in intuitionistic logic?
Those are the questions that I will address in the remainder of this paper.
6Here, as elsewhere in this paper, I am assuming that we are only concerned with finite
premise sets.
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3 Making Monotonicity Explicit
Weakening is not always admissible in NM. However, it is sometimes ad-
missible; e.g., it is admissible to weaken instances of Reflexivity. We want
to introduce an operator that allows us to keep track of where Weakening is
admissible. In order to do this, it is helpful to think of monotonicity as anal-
ogous to a modality. We can think of premise sets as points of evaluation.
From each premise set all and only its supersets are accessible. A sentence
is verified at a premise set just in case the premise set implies the sentence.
A set, Γ, monotonically implies a sentence, A, just in case all points of eval-
uation accessible from Γ verify A. Looking at monotonicity in this way,
it is natural to understand it as a kind of necessity. Hence, it is natural to
express it in a similar way in the object language, namely by introducing an
operator, , such that Γ |∼ A just in case ∀∆ ⊆ L− (∆,Γ |∼ A).
Fortunately, such an operator can easily be introduced. That is in part
because it can be shown that weakening with arbitrary sets of sentences is
admissible for a particular sequent just in case the sequent can be weakened
with arbitrary sets of atomic sentences. That is, ∀∆ ⊆ L− (∆,Γ |∼ A) iff
∀∆0 ⊆ L0− (∆0,Γ |∼ A). Hence, it suffices to have an operator that keeps
track of when we can weaken with arbitrary sets of atoms. But we already
have a device that does that in the meta-language, namely the upward arrow.
All we need to do is to find rules that use the upward arrow in the right way
to introduce the box. It can be shown that the following rules do that:
Γ |∼ ↑A
RB
Γ |∼ [↑]A
Γ, A |∼ B
LB
Γ,A |∼ B
In other words, if we introduce the box into NM by adding these two rules,
then the box obeys the following principle.7
BOX Γ |∼ A iff ∀∆ ⊆ L− (Γ,∆ |∼ A).
This means that the box makes explicit where monotonicity holds locally.
We can thus keep track of the local admissibility of Weakening in the object
language.
7I omit the proof for reasons of space. The strategy is to show that Γ |∼ A iff Γ |∼↑ A
iff ∀∆ ⊆ L− (Γ,∆ |∼ A). The left-to-right direction of the first biconditional is shown via
induction on proof-height. The left-to-right direction of the second biconditional is shown by
induction on the complexity of A. The other direction is straightforward via PushUp, UN, and
RB.
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4 Making Intuitionism Explicit
Keeping control over Weakening turned out to be relatively easy in NM.
Unfortunately, keeping control over Cut is more complicated. However, it is
easy to introduce an operator that keeps track of intuitionistic implications.
Hence, I will start with that.
In this section, I will introduce an operator,I (pronounced “I-box”), that
allows us to keep track of intuitionistic logic. More precisely, A0, ..., An `
B holds in intuitionistic logic just in case IA0, ...,IAn |∼ IB is derivable
in NM plus the I-box, a system which I will call NMI . Thus, the I-box is
our analog to Girard’s shriek.
For ease of exposition, let us write I Γ for a set of sentences that is like
Γ except that every sentence is prefaced by an I-box.
How can we introduce the I-box? It can be shown that the sequents of
intuitionistic logic are all and only the sequents of NM that can be derived
in proof-trees all of whose leaves are atomic instances of Reflexivity. This
is easy to see if we realize that the rules of NM and the rules of LJ are
intertranslatable if Weakening and Cut hold for the leaves of proof-trees.
For in this case, we can push all applications of Weakening and Cut into the
leaves. And the rest of the translation is straightforward.
Since intuitionistic sequents are exactly those sequents that can be de-
rived in NM from leaves that are all instances of Reflexivity, we can keep
track of intuitionistic logic by keeping track of such squents. The obvious
way to do that is to mark atomic instances of Reflexivity and then allow
the rules to transfer the mark from the premise sequent(s) to the conclusion
sequent. We do this in the meta-language by introducing a new kind of
snake-turnstile: |∼I. Since this turnstile can be combined with the upward
arrow turnstile to yield |∼↑XI via PushUp and UN, we double the number of
our turnstiles. We introduce |∼I at the ground level by adding the following
axioms:
Additional Axioms of NMI
Ax3: If p ∈ Γ ⊆ L0−, then Γ |∼I p is an axiom.
We allow all of the rules of NM to be applied to sequents with our new
turnstiles, i.e. to sequents of the form Γ |∼[↑X]I A. Next we need to introduce
I in such a way that it expresses our new turnstile in much the way in which
the box expresses the plain upward arrow. The following rules do that:
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Additional Rules of NMI
Γ, A |∼ IB
LIB
Γ,IA |∼ [I]B
Γ, A |∼ IB
RIB
Γ, A |∼ [I]IB
It is easy to show that NMI preserves Reflexivity and is a conservative
extension of any nonmonotonic material consequence relation that obeys
ExFF and Reflexivity.8 Most importantly, however, the I-box lets us keep
track—in the object language—of intuitionistic logic.
Theorem 2 IA0, ...,IAn |∼ IB holds in NMI , where A0, ..., An and
B don’t contain any I-boxes, iff A0, ..., An ` B holds in intuitionistic logic.
Proof. (⇐) If A0, ..., An ` B is derivable in intuitionistic logic, it can be
derived in Gentzen’s LJ (Gentzen, 1934). Given a proof-tree in LJ, we can
translate it into a proof-tree in NM. In order to do this, we push Cut and
Weakening into the leaves. Then we translate all rule applications in ac-
cordance with the translation manual given above. All the leaves of the
resulting tree are instances of Reflexivity, which are derivable in NM. Mov-
ing to NMI , we use |∼[↑X]I -turnstiles in the leaves. The root of the resulting
tree is A0, ..., An |∼I B. By RIB and repeated applications of LIB, we get
IA0, ...,IAn |∼ IB.
(⇒) Suppose IA0, ...,IAn |∼ IB. This must come by LIB, RIB, or
ExFF. If it comes by LIB, the premise is IA0, ...,IAn−1, An |∼I IB.
We can show by induction on proof-height that having at least one I-box on
the left as a principal operator suffices to ensure that A0, ..., An |∼I IB.
Moreover, IB on the right can only come from ExFF or RIB. In either
case, we can get B instead. Hence, A0, ..., An |∼I B. The same reasoning
applies to the cases of RIB and ExFF. We can also show that if there are
no I-boxes in A0, ..., An, B, then we can derive A0, ..., An |∼I B just in
case A0, ..., An ` B holds in intuitionistic logic. To show this, we simply
reverse the translation scheme provided above. 
With this result in hand, we can say that the intuitionist is reasoning as if
all sentences were prefaced by a silent “I ”. From the perspective of NMI ,
the problem with intuitionistic logic, is that it is blind to the rich structure
8For reasons of space, I am omitting the proofs. They work similarly to those for NM,
which are sketched in (Hlobil, 2016).
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consequence and incoherence that does not derive from Reflexivity. The I-
box allows us to restrict our vision ‘artificially,’ as it were, to single out all
and only the sequents that the intuitionist can see.
There is a general strategy behind the techniques that we have used in the
last two sections: (a) We want to keep track of a local structural feature of
our consequence relation within the object language; this structural feature
was the admissibility of Weakening in the first case and the derivability in
intuitionistic logic in the second case. (b) We do this by first introducing a
new kind of turnstile that filters out all and only the sequents at which the
feature in question holds. (c) Next we introduce an operator that marks the
result of this filtration in the object language. The result is that we have an
object language expression that allows us to mark precisely the region of
our logic within which the structural feature in question holds.
5 Making Some Local Transitivity Explicit
Turning to transitivity, everything would be plain sailing if we were able
to keep track of when Cut is admissible in a way that is analogous to what
we did for Weakening. However, keeping track of local Cut admissibility
turns out to be far more difficult than keeping track of local Weakening
admissibility or intuitionistic logic.
The problem is that the admissibility of Cut is not preserved by our rules.
To see this, let’s define Cn0(Γ) as the set of atomic consequences of Γ and
Cn(Γ) for the consequences of Γ in NM. Suppose Γ obeys Cut in the base
consequence relation, i.e., if ∆ ⊆ Cn0(Γ), then Cn0(Γ) ⊇ Cn0(Γ ∪ ∆).
Now, suppose that Γ 6 |∼0 p and Γ, p 6 |∼0⊥ and Γ 6 |∼0⊥. So, Γ 6 |∼ ¬p.
However, suppose also that Γ |∼0 q and Γ, p, q |∼0⊥, which doesn’t violate
the assumption that Γ obeys Cut because p is not a consequence of Γ. By
RN, Γ, q |∼ ¬p. Hence, q ∈ Cn(Γ) and ¬p 6∈ Cn(Γ) but ¬p ∈ Cn(Γ ∪
{q}).
Unfortunately, I don’t know how to solve this problem in full generality.
Here I can only make a first step towards a solution. The step consists in
a generalization of the idea behind the I-box. In the case of the I-box, we
exploited the fact that the atomic instances of Reflexivity are closed under
Cut and Weakening. That makes Cut and Weakening admissible in proof-
trees all of whose leaves are instances of Reflexivity. The general lesson
that we should learn from this special case is that a set of sequents is closed
under Cut if they can all be derived in proof-trees all of whose leaves belong
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to a set of atomic sequents at are closed under Cut and Weakening. Let’s
define sets of atomic sequents that have this property:
Definition 1 A set, S, of atomic sequents has the T+W property iff (a) if
Γ |∼0 p ∈ S, then ∀∆ ⊆ L0 (∆,Γ |∼0 p ∈ S); and (b) if Γ |∼0 p ∈ S
and Γ, p |∼0 q ∈ S, then Γ, |∼0 q ∈ S.
Let’s focus on maximal sets that have the T+W property, i.e., T+W sets
such that no proper superset of them has the property. Let’s enumerate these
sets and call them S0, ...,Sn. We can now treat each of these sets like we
have treated the atomic instances of Reflexivity when we introduced the I-
box. For each Si we can introduce a new kind of turnstile, |∼[↑X]i , and a
new operator, T i (pronounced “T-box”, for transitivity-box). For the new
turnstiles, we add axioms with those turnstiles.
Ax3: If Γ |∼0 p is in Si, then Γ |∼i p is an axiom.
We apply the usual NM rules to our new kinds of sequents if they are of
the same kind, i.e. if the same subscript on the turnstile occurs in all the
sequents in the application of the rule. Moreover, we add rules that introduce
an operator T i for each Si.
Γ, A |∼iB
LTB
Γ,T iA |∼[i]B
Γ |∼iA
RTB
Γ |∼[i]T iA
Let’s call the resulting system NMT . In this system we can keep track of
some regions in which Cut is admissible, namely regions that are exten-
sions of maximal T+W sets in the base. More precisely, we can show the
following:
Theorem 3 Sequents of the form Γ |∼i A are closed under Cut.
Proof. First, we note that in order to derive a sequent of the form Γ |∼i A,
all the sequents in the proof-tree must be of that form. The rest of the proof
follows Gentzen’s original Cut-elimination proof very closely. Just as in
Gentzen, it is a double induction on rank and degree; and we can divide
the cases in the way he did. In effect, we push Cut up into the leaves;
and we know that Cut holds among the leaves. The proof is tedious but
straightforward. 
So we have a way to mark off some regions in which Cut holds locally in
the metalanguage of the sequent calculus. But we also have object language
operators that allow us to keep track of these regions.
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Theorem 4 If we can derive T iA0, ...,T iAm |∼ T iB in NMT and we
can derive T iA0, ...,T iAm,T iB |∼ T iC, then T iA0, ...,T iAm |∼ T iC
also holds.
Proof. It suffices to show that if T iα0, ...,T iαk |∼ T iβ, then we also have
α0, ...αk |∼i β. The proof is parallel to the one for the I-box. We argue
by induction on proof-height and ifT iα0, ...,T iαk |∼ T iβ, this must come
from α0, ...αk |∼i T iβ. Then we argue that wherever T iβ was first intro-
duced into the proof-tree, we can replace it with β. 
This technique gives us a family of object language operators each of
which keeps track of a particular region of our consequence relation that is
closed under Cut. The regions we keep track of are extensions of atomic
sequents that are closed under Weakening and Cut. It may be worth men-
tioning that these regions behave intuitionistically, in the sense that they are
equivalent to extensions of the underlying atomic sequents via the rules of
Gentzen’s LJ.
Let me point out some limitations of this technique. (1) It does not give
us a way to say that a set, Γ, obeys Cut in the sense that ∆ ⊆ Cn(Γ), then
Cn(Γ) ⊇ Cn(Γ ∪∆). After all, it can happen that Γ |∼i B and Γ, B |∼ A
but not Γ |∼ A. (2) The technique does not allow us to keep track of
regions that are closed under Cut but where Weakening fails. (3) There is no
guarantee that the technique allows us to keep track of all the sets of sequents
that are closed under Cut and Weakening. For some such regions may not
be traceable to monotonic and transitive regions in the atomic consequence
relation.
Despite these limitations, the T-boxes allow us to make explicit in the
object language a particular class of cases in which Cut is admissible. From
the perspective of NMT , to insist that Cut holds globally is to insist that
we should always think of our premises and conclusions as if they were
prefaced by silent T-boxes (with the same superscript). In NMT we can talk
about such implications without being blind to all other implications.
6 Conclusion
Let’s take stock. The sequent calculus NM extends a nonmonotonic, non-
transitive material consequence relation over atomic sentences to the lan-
guage of propositional logic. The resulting consequence relation is supra-
intuitionistic. We can introduce an operator, , that keeps track of where
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monotonicity holds locally. Moreover, we can introduce another operator,
I , that keeps track of intuitionistic logic within NM. Finally, we can intro-
duce a family of operators, T i, that keep track of some of the regions of our
consequence relation that are closed under Cut and Weakening.
The results I have presented here are limited in various respects. In par-
ticular, we still need better ways to keep track of where Cut is admissible.
If we can develop such techniques and do the same for the other structural
principles, we will have a general framework in which what used to look
like disagreements about the foundations of logic will emerge as disagree-
ments about particular claims that can be formulated in a common logical
framework.
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